World Food Programme — Bridge grant to retain Bihar staff (March 2025)

Note: This page summarizes the rationale behind a GiveWell grant to the World Food Programme (WFP). WFP staff reviewed this page prior to publication.

Update

Since making this grant, we've decided to deprioritize further funding for the World Food Programme's rice fortification technical assistance program in Bihar, India. We recently received baseline survey results from two other Indian states, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, suggesting that the quality of fortified rice is higher than we had expected, raising questions about the need for additional support to improve the quality of fortified rice in Bihar. More recently, the government of India has also paused all support for its fortified rice program. We may consider a secondary analysis to verify the results from West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, and could revisit funding opportunities in rice fortification depending on what we learn and whether the government restarts the program.

In a nutshell

In March 2025, GiveWell recommended a $45,000 bridge grant to the World Food Programme (WFP) to fund technical assistance (TA) for rice fortification in Bihar, India. This grant will enable WFP to continue its work in Bihar for three months (April-July 2025) while we complete our investigation into providing longer-term support (the program’s current funding expires in April 2025 with no possibility of renewal).

We are recommending this grant because:

  • We think there's a good chance (50%) we will recommend a larger grant to this program, as we think it is potentially cost-effective (around 11x as cost-effective as cash transfers)1 and our sense is that stakeholders support TA for rice fortification in Bihar.
  • We need additional time to incorporate planned updates to our iron fortification model and gather more information about rice production in Bihar, and we do not wish the program to discontinue before we can make our final funding decision.
  • We think providing bridge funding will increase the likelihood that WFP is able to retain staff in Bihar who have established relationships with government officials and technical expertise in rice fortification, reducing program start-up costs and increasing program effectiveness should we decide to fund longer-term support.

Our key reservations about this grant include:

  • We may decide not to fund technical assistance programming in Bihar after a deeper investigation.
  • We might be underestimating the timeline for making a decision on the full grant.
  • WFP staff might still choose to leave due to uncertainty about the program's future or other opportunities.

Published: May 2026

The intervention

Anemia is highly prevalent in India.2 People with anemia may feel tired, weak, and short of breath. Iron-deficiency anemia has also been associated with other negative physical, psychological, and cognitive effects.3

There is some evidence that iron fortification reduces the prevalence of iron deficiency and anemia.4 Rice, which is a staple food in India, can be fortified with iron by creating kernels made of fortified premix, and then mixing them with real rice kernels. This is a complex process, with a number of potential challenges that might lead to lower-than-expected iron consumption, including:5

  • Sometimes, not enough premix is added to the fortified rice kernels and/or not enough fortified kernels are added to the rice, which means the rice will contain less iron than recommended.
  • The kernels containing fortified premix can be differentiated from standard rice, and some consumers may remove the fortified kernels before cooking due to their undesirable attributes when cooked.
  • Fortified kernels have a different density from standard rice, which increases the likelihood that the premix will be unevenly mixed with the regular rice kernels.
  • Myths and misconceptions among program participants lead to fortified rice not being consumed.

The Indian government has mandated that any rice distributed through government-run public distribution systems (PDS) must be fortified.6 However, states may face barriers in complying with this directive, including:

  • A lack of state-level government capacity to develop and implement standardized guidelines for rice fortification,7 monitor the program’s success by testing fortified rice to ensure it meets quality standards,8 and implement successful awareness and education campaigns.9
  • A lack of millers and premix producers with the technical capacity to meet the required quality standards.10

The organization

The World Food Programme (WFP) provides technical assistance to state governments to improve implementation and oversight of rice fortification. WFP's approach includes but is not limited to:11

  • Capacity building for government agencies, millers, and FRK suppliers through training on standard fortification operating procedures
  • Strengthening monitoring systems through random testing of fortified rice and conducting third-party audits
  • Improving procurement practices by advising on policies and enforcement measures

The grant

WFP has been implementing technical assistance for rice fortification in Bihar, but this funding is set to expire in April 2025, with no possibility of renewal.12 Our preliminary analysis indicates that Bihar could be a promising state for continued rice fortification technical assistance, but we don’t expect to make a decision on whether to support the program until June 2025.

This $45,000 bridge grant will cover WFP's staff salary costs in Bihar for three months (April-July 2025), the period between the end of existing funding and when we expect to make a decision about whether to fund longer-term support, crucially enabling the retention of staff for this period. If we decide to recommend additional funding for WFP in Bihar, any unused funds from this bridge grant will be rolled into the overall program budget.

We are not recommending similar bridge grants in Assam or Maharashtra, where WFP also currently works. This is because our cost-effectiveness analysis suggests that TA programs in those states are significantly less cost-effective and well below our funding bar. The difference in cost-effectiveness between Bihar and these states is primarily due to the higher number of beneficiaries reached by fortified rice produced in Bihar.13 Bihar produces substantially more fortified rice than Assam or Maharashtra, which means improvements in fortification quality at a similar program cost would benefit more people in Bihar than in those two other states.

Budget for grant activities

The grant budget for the three months comprises:14


Staff and other personnel costs $25,060
Travel $5,370
Meeting and other operating costs, supplies, and sub-awards to partners $2,983
Equipment $1,969
Direct support costs $6,370
Indirect support costs $2,715
Total $44,518

The case for the grant

We are recommending this grant because:

  • We think there's a good chance (50%) we will recommend a larger grant. Our current best guess for the cost-effectiveness of rice fortification TA in Bihar is that it is approximately 11 times as cost-effective as direct cash transfers, above our funding bar of “10x”.15 This estimate is based on the large volume of rice fortified in Bihar (about 1.5 million metric tons per year) and the potential for improved fortification to benefit a significant number of people.
  • We need additional time to make a final decision on longer-term funding, and we do not wish the program to discontinue before we can make this decision. We want to incorporate planned updates to our iron fortification model and gather more information about rice production in Bihar before committing to a larger grant. Based on our current investigation timeline, we don't expect to make a decision to fund the full program until June 2025.
  • This bridge funding will reduce program start-up costs if we decide to fund the full program. By enabling WFP to retain key staff currently working on fortification in Bihar, we expect to reduce expenses associated with recruiting and training staff should we decide to provide longer-term support. Staff continuity would also allow for an immediate transition to the larger program without delays.
  • Retaining WFP's institutional knowledge and government connections will likely improve future program effectiveness. We think that retaining existing staff would likely improve the quality of implementation, as existing personnel already have technical expertise and relationships with the state government, which could facilitate more effective program execution should we decide to provide longer-term support.

Risks and reservations

Our main reservations about this grant are:

  • We may decide not to fund technical assistance programming in Bihar after the bridge period. If the results of our investigation lead us to revise our cost-effectiveness estimates downward below our bar, or if other factors make the program less promising than we currently expect, we may decide not to recommend additional funding for rice fortification TA in Bihar. Factors that could lead us to think that the program no longer looks promising include:
    • Ongoing updates to our iron fortification model, which could decrease the program cost-effectiveness,
    • Uncertainty about the amount of rice fortified in Bihar: our estimate comes from the WFP, but we haven't independently verified this figure, and
    • Uncertainty about estimated program costs: we estimate that the program will cost approximately $515,000 over three years. However, this is based on a provisional budget, and the final budget could be higher than we currently think.
  • We might be underestimating the timeline for making a decision on the full grant. Given the above uncertainties related to our investigation, it's possible that our decision-making process will extend beyond the three-month period covered by this grant, meaning we should be making a bridge grant for longer than three months.
  • Staff may leave despite the bridge funding. While we're providing this funding specifically to retain experienced staff for potential future TA programming, staff might still choose to leave due to uncertainty about the program's future or other opportunities. This would mean the grant fails to preserve the expertise and networks we're trying to maintain.

Plans for follow up

We plan to continue our investigation into funding technical assistance for rice fortification in Bihar and make a decision by June 2025. Specific steps in our investigation include:

  • Updating our cost-effectiveness analysis with planned changes to our iron fortification model
  • Triangulating rice production estimates in Bihar with experts
  • Discussing monitoring and evaluation plans with WFP
  • Updating the budget based on WFP input

Internal forecasts

For this grant, we are recording the following forecasts:

Confidence Prediction By time
50% We recommend a >$500,000 grant to support WFP's technical assistance program for rice fortification in Bihar. December 2025

Our process

  • We had several conversations with WFP about their technical assistance approach and their current work in Bihar.
  • We spoke with the Food Secretary of Bihar to understand his perspective on WFP's work and the ongoing challenges with rice fortification in the state.
  • We completed a cost-effectiveness analysis of technical assistance for rice fortification in Bihar and other states where WFP currently works.
  • We spoke with PATH, another organization working on rice fortification in India, to understand their approach and how it differs from WFP's.

Sources

Document Source
Dominic Schofield (Program Director, Food Fortification Technical Assistance Accelerator), conversation with GiveWell, April 5, 2023 Unpublished
GiveWell meta-analysis of fortified rice impact on anemia in RCTs, 2023 Source
GiveWell, CEA of Nutrition International's rice fortification program, 2024 Source
GiveWell, non-verbatim notes from calls with WFP, October 2024-January 2025 Unpublished
GiveWell, World Food Programme (TA) Iron CEA 2.0, 2025 Source
Government of Maharashtra, Distribution of the fortified rice through PDS and Milling Source (archive)
IHME, Global Burden of Disease Source
Nutrition International, Investigation plan for TA for fortification of rice in India, February 15, 2023 Source
Nutrition International, Questions and answers on TA for fortification of rice in India (February 15, 2023) Unpublished
Nutrition International, responses to GiveWell questions (March 1, 2023) Source
World Food Programme (WFP) Source
World Food Programme, "TA budget for Bihar for 3 months," February 2025 Unpublished
World Health Organization, Anaemia fact sheet, February 10, 2025 Source (archive)
  • 1Prior to November 2025, we used a benchmark that we described as multiples of “cash,” based on an outdated assessment of the impact of GiveDirectly's unconditional cash transfers program. While we’ve changed how we calculate our benchmark to no longer be directly tied to GiveDirectly's program, the value of that benchmark remains similar, which means our cost-effectiveness estimates remain comparable across the old and new approaches. The cash transfers benchmark referred to in this grant page is the pre-November 2025 benchmark.
  • 2Roughly 42% prevalence in 2021 among those 5-14 years old according to IHME’s Global Burden of Disease study.
  • 3“Anaemia causes symptoms such as fatigue, reduced physical work capacity, and shortness of breath. Anaemia is an indicator of poor nutrition and other health problems.” World Health Organization, Anaemia fact sheet, February 10, 2025.
  • 4Our internal meta-analysis finds that fortified rice reduces the prevalence of anemia by 29%, though we have some open questions about these findings that we detail in the aforementioned report.
  • 5“The rice fortification through SSNPs is being scaled up quickly. Some of the quality challenges that we expect are:
    • varying levels of micronutrients;
    • easily distinguishable kernels;
    • changes to fortified rice after being cooked;
    • loss of micronutrients during storage and transport;
    • segregation of the FRK during transport and
    • myths and misconceptions among beneficiaries.”
    Nutrition International, responses to GiveWell questions (March 1, 2023), p. 3 (unpublished).
  • 6“For the prevention of the high volume of the Anaemia in the country and the state, the central government has decided to distribute the fortified rice, prepared by mixing the FRK (Fortified Rice Kernel – FRK) (made from rice flour and which contains the high volume of the micronutrients such as Iron, Folic Acid and Vitamin B12) in the CMR in the proportion of 1 (FRK):100 (CMR) [common milled rice], through the public distribution system.” Government of Maharashtra, Government of Maharashtra, Distribution of the fortified rice through PDS and Milling, April 18, 2022.
  • 7"Standardised guidelines: While there are national standards and guidelines for rice fortification, many of these guidelines, especially for FRKs [fortified rice kernels], fortified rice blending, and its packaging, storage and testing are either not standardised at state-level or are not consistently implemented. With non-standardized guidelines the overall quality of the FRKs and fortified rice is affected, and monitoring of the overall program is limited." Nutrition International, Questions and answers on TA for fortification of rice in India (February 15, 2023), p. 7 (unpublished).
  • 8"Regulatory monitoring and QA/QC: At state-level there are current gaps in the capacity of laboratory infrastructure and personnel to test the FRKs and fortified rice to ensure quality meets national standards. These gaps further limit the ability of governments to monitor the overall program." Nutrition International, Questions and answers on TA for fortification of rice in India (February 15, 2023), p. 7 (unpublished).
  • 9Consumer awareness: With the scale of India, it is difficult to reach every
    beneficiary with messaging that explains the benefits of fortified rice, which has
    further been exacerbated by the quality challenges noted above. This has
    enabled the persistence of myths and incorrect messaging about the benefits or
    harm of fortified rice.” Nutrition International, Questions and answers on TA for fortification of rice in India (February 15, 2023), p. 8 (unpublished).
  • 10Dominic Schofield (Program Director, Food Fortification Technical Assistance Accelerator), conversation with GiveWell, April 5, 2023 (unpublished).
  • 11GiveWell, non-verbatim notes from calls with WFP, October 2024-January 2025 (unpublished).
  • 12 GiveWell, non-verbatim notes from calls with WFP, October 2024-January 2025 (unpublished).
  • 13See GiveWell, World Food Programme (TA) Iron CEA 2.0, 2025
  • 14World Food Programme, “TA budget for Bihar for 3 months,” February 2025 (unpublished).
  • 15
    • At the time of writing this page, GiveWell’s funding bar is to fund grants that we estimate to be ~10x or more as cost-effective as cash transfers. This benchmark is based on ‘moral weights’, a system we use to quantify the benefits of different impacts (e.g. increased income vs reduced deaths). We benchmark to a value of 1, which we define as the value of doubling someone’s consumption for one year. Our estimate of the value of direct cash transfers is 0.00335 per $. For more on how we use moral weights, see this document. For more on how we use cost-effectiveness estimates in our grant-making, see this page.
    • Our current best guess for the cost-effectiveness of rice fortification TA in Bihar is that it is approximately 11 times as cost-effective as direct cash transfers. While our CEA estimates that WFP’s program is roughly 12x direct cash transfers, this estimate does not incorporate expected reductions in cost-effectiveness from ongoing updates to our iron fortification model. We think these updates will decrease cost-effectiveness by about 10%, which results in a bottom-line CE estimate of 11x.