GiveDirectly

February 2016

Agenda for today's discussion

- Process: reflections & feedback
- Plan: 2016 priorities & budget
- Policy influence: objectives and approaches to performance measurement
- Recruiting: update
- Partnerships: update
- Research: update
- Ongoing M&E: walkthrough of three recent decisions
- Room for funding


Process: reflections on review process

- We discussed our feedback from last year while it was fresh on our minds in January. The changes we have already discussed we feel will lead to a better process:
 - Hearing your evaluation criteria and adding the 6 month update, so that we are sharing information relevant to your recommendation throughout the year
 - Ensuring we are on the same page about cost-effectiveness analysis and take the appropriate amount of time to provide input on it
 - Continuing to discuss policy impact and find ways to incorporate it into your recommendation
- We also want to flag that a higher proportion of funds delivered this year will be through projects designed for policy influence – which increases the importance of aligning on how to think about ROI beyond direct impact


From board deck

- 1. Raise >55M in revenue (45M outside of GV funds)
- 2. Implement [redacted] partnership in Rwanda and secure 2 more institutional partnerships (2x our previous JV goal)
- 3. Implement and evaluate first meaningful test of a Basic Income Guarantee; use surrounding publicity to diversify the brand from "the lump sum cash transfer exponents" to "the cash transfer experts"
- 4. Scale field operations:
 - Double capacity of field org, moving \$43M
 - Prepare to double capacity again to \$100M in 2017 (systems, hiring pipeline)
 - Build specific operational capabilities:
 - Test payments in areas with no payments infrastructure
 - Test lower-cost/higher-throughput variants of model

We budgeted based on 60M cash in hand and 13M in (conservatively) forecast revenue



Of this we have allocated 47 M now, and expect to allocate more during the year



Recruiting: we added a domestic lead and have three offers out in field management and partnerships development

	Existing employees	Additions since last update	Ongoing searches
Marketing	 Sharon, customer service Max, Comms. associate Sean Moriarty and Jeff Kayser, full time front and backend developer contractors through app v 1.0 		 VP Marketing: engaging search firm High net worth fundraiser – ongoing discussions
Partnerships	Paul and MichaelSupport from Carolina		 Senior Partnerships Manager- one offer made, person with a unique and strategic network VP Partnerships- deprioritizing search given above
General Management	Paul and MichaelPiali	Ian Bassin, COO-Domestic	
Finance & Operations	 Carolina Rebecca Gavin Outsourced providers (BDO, Skadden) 		 Finance Director (East Africa): in-person interview round scheduled with finalists Finance and Investment Associate (US): still sourcing Software Engineer: engaged search firm, sourcing
New roles adding field capacity	Joe Huston: Regional Director, Special Projects	 Paddy McCann, Operations Manager 	Special Projects Field Manager: closing finalist candidate
Country Directors / Field Directors	 Mitch Riley (CD*, Rwanda) Will Le (CD*, Kenya) Eric Friedman (CD*, Uganda) 		Up to 7 more Field Directors: two offers made, several candidates in the pipeline




^{*} We now distinguish between "Country Directors" with overall country management responsibility, and "Field Directors" who will manage specific projects.

Policy: we aim to use the direct delivery of transfers to also influence the broader aid sector

10 donor governments give 84% of total development and humanitarian aid ...

Official development assistance 2013 \$ billions




Total ODA: 134.8 billion

... which they use to do work through their own agencies or give to multilaterals

2013 ODA components

- Development work contracted by donor gov't
- Funds sent to multilaterals (UN, IMF, WB, etc.)
- Humanitarian aid contracted by donor gov't
- Net debt relief grants



- The proportion of ODA that is cash is not consistently reported, but estimated to be very small (e.g., <6% of humanitarian aid)
- Total ODA is much more than the global poverty gap, estimated at \$66B (Brookings)

We see three broad opportunities for such influence

Type of transfer	Example project	Example effects beyond direct impact of transfers
"Vanilla" transfers funded by the public	Kenya rolling campaign	 GD's general growth & visibility led to the inclusion of two GD board members on DfID's humanitarian cash panel Press coverage of our charitable work has led directly to increased institutional use of cash transfers (e.g. [Redacted] Rwanda project) and to self-reported changes in decision maker's use of the thought experiment "is this better than just giving the money away" (e.g. [Redacted])
Transfers evaluated by an external researcher	GE	 Will enable us and other cash advocates to address concerns raised by senrio policy-makers (e.g., VP of [Redacted]) concerned about inflationary impacts Will enable us to identify impacts by sub-groups that matter for specific funders (e.g. women, children for [redacted]) May attract coverage due to its scale and audacity which increases the visibility of cash transfer to policy-makers more generally (as above)
Transfers delivered as part of a structured partnership with a donor gov't	[Redacted] Rwanda	 Cleared a path through procurement and [Redacted] so that future cash projects can be more easily funded Has led [Redacted] mission to request RCTs of two new activities in health and education (employability training) Depending on results, may shift spending patterns of [Redacted] Rwanda mission Now being used to motivate set-up of a mechanism to more easily enable other countries to do the same

While the definition of ultimate success is straight-forward, indicators of intermediate progress an GD contribution are trickier

Measures of shifts in the

sector

Near-term indicators

- Donors adopt cash, and cash benchmarking, into their policy statements (e.g. UN Secy Gen'l report for WHS)
- Increased frequency of cash projects reported, e.g. via CaLP
- Decision-makers reference cash option as influencing their choices

Ultimate metrics (>10 years)

- Lower proportion of people living in extreme poverty
- Higher share of aid spending for which a clearly defined use is reported
- Higher share of aid spending on cash and programming with evidence of being at least as effective as cash

Indicators that GD was impactful

- Policy statements or press releases mention GD or reference evidence we helped to generate or publicize
- When asked, decision-makers attribute an important role to GD or to GDinfluenced actors in their choices

Partnerships: the offer of matching funds for partnerships with institutional actors has opened up negotiations

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Research: several studies will have results available by end of year, Rwanda and [redacted] kicking off mid-year

GE	 Baseline complete and report attached End line beginning this spring 	Aspirations	 Re-located after refusals in Rachuonyo North disrupted coordination Tentatively beginning baseline late spring
Ideas42	Preparing for endline, complete by fall	Gender	Still working on IRB
Phone data collection	Complete– following up for results	contracts	
[Redacted] (coffee)	 [Redacted] is a German foundation very aligned with effective altruism and transparency principles RCT aims to study how UCTs impact recipients with access to high investmet return opportunity, in this case coffee growing, which is an industry core to [Redacted]'s mission Broader goal is using [Redacted] and study to introduce model to German and UK philanthropic sectors with evangelizing partner 		
Rwanda			
	NB: Redact Rwanda information prior to publishing, not public until pilot complete		

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Ongoing M&E: for process changes not evaluated by RCT, we assessed likely impacts on performance and efficacy as follows

		Assessment		
Decision	Question(s) raised	Initial	Ongoing	
Moved to Homa Bay, where all new enrollment in Kenya is taking place	 Are impacts in Homa Bay likely to be similar to those in Rarieda? 	 Physically closer to Rarieda than Siaya was Poverty rate is higher than in Rarieda (50% vs 46%) See sub-county and village selection process (attachments) 	 Weekly updates on refusals, which were a challenge in the region Standard ops reporting, hotline, follow up before next transfer send 	
Adopted new targeting rule, in use everywhere in Homa Bay	 Are we still finding the poorest potential recipients? Do recipients still perceive the process as reasonable? 	 Recipients identified using new rule are living on ~50 cents per day, similar to Rarieda's 65 (consumption data, attached) Focus groups reported our positively on perceived fairness of criteria (attached) 	 Staff feedback on complaints related to criteria Standard ops reporting, hotline, follow up before next transfer send Generally we expect to reevaluate targeting accuracy after meaningful changes using a light-weight consumption module 	
Restructured Ugandan payment model, which is now the same as in Kenya (distributed cash-out with a token and two lump sums)	 Are people successfully collecting transfers? How if at all are impacts different? 	 In-person observation and calls to a selection of vulnerable recipients confirming they cashed out (attached) Likely makes impacts more similar to those of lump-sum transfers evaluated in Rarieda, v stream payments (more investment impact, less nutrition) 	 Hotline calls to receive requests from people having issues cashing out— staff monitor for spikes Standard ops reporting, hotline, follow up before next transfer send – for this change, will flag recipients who have not cashed out Can leverage [redacted] work to evaluate 	

Room for funding: in sum, we estimate a max budget year capacity of \$78 M and current RFF of at least \$18M

- 1) We estimate max throughput per FD moving retail donations at \$14M/year in Kenya / Uganda and 7/year in Rwanda. Ke / Ug estimate is revised downward from our last due to
 - a) Unexpectedly higher rate of refusals in Homa Bay
 - Slower data collection due to more complex targeting criteria and content generation for donors
 - Desire to focus our FDs on hiring & training for the future (e.g. Office Admin, HR Manager)
- We are allocating a significant share of this capacity to structured projects which typically involve more coordination and hence lower throughput per FD (4 structured projects with an average throughput of \$6M / FD, plus basic income with projected throughput of \$17.5M / FD)
- 3) Adding up, we project capacity to move \$78M this year including both structured and standard projects. With \$60M of this in hand, we project residual RFF of at least \$18M, and possibly more if we continue to hold part of the \$25M GV grant through year-end for negotiation purposes.

We have not thought about how this relates to "capacity-relevant" gaps – we'd like to discuss and understand the concept a bit more first.

Room for funding: detail and decomposition of changes since last update

RFF calculated for in 2015 review:

Simplest, high volume lump-sum model

	No. C/FDs	Avg. individual capacity	Annual cost (transfers and delivery)
Kenya/Uganda	5	19	94.9
Rwanda	1	8.8	8.8
Total	6		103.7

Partially adjusted RFF holding headcount and project type assumptions fixed but adjusting throughput assumption to reflect higher refusal rate, more intensive data collection, greater emphasis on team-building

	No. C/FDs	Avg. individual capacity	Annual cost (transfers and delivery)
Kenya/Uganda	5	14	70
Rwanda	1	7	7
Total	6		77

Fully adjusted RFF reflecting these changes as well as additional hiring and the addition of more structured projects, lower "vanilla" capacity due to research coordination and additional FD onboarding

	No. C/FDs	Avg. individual capacity	Annual cost (transfers and delivery)
"Vanilla" model	3.5	12	42
Structured projects	3	6	18
Basic income	1	17.5	17.5
Total	7.5		78